Products Liability in Sales Transactions by Niibori, Satoshi & Cosway, Richard
Washington Law Review 
Volume 42 
Number 2 Asian Law Symposium 
3-1-1967 
Products Liability in Sales Transactions 
Satoshi Niibori 
Richard Cosway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Satoshi Niibori & Richard Cosway, Products Liability in Sales Transactions, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 483 (1967). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol42/iss2/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN SALES TRANSACTIONS
SATOSHI NIIBORI* and RICHARD COSWAY**
I. CONCEPT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Products liability involves the vulnerability of a supplier of goods in
a sales transaction to compensate for defects in the goods and for harm
or injury resulting from those defects. The discussion of Japanese law
which follows deals with the liability of manufacturers. It does not
extend to liability of wholesalers and retailers, since there is no Japa-
nese case authority in point.' In the United States, manufacturer's
liability is involved in many of the cases and in much of the literature,
but there is a vast amount of additional authority involving the liability
of wholesalers and retailers. Because some of the theories of liability
operate differently vis-h-vis these suppliers, some attention is given in
the discussion to their vulnerability.
The person to whom the duty of making compensation may be owed
is identified, for the purposes of this article, as the consumer. This
term is appropriate enough if it be kept in mind that others, such as
victims of auto accidents caused by defects in vehicles other than
theirs, may sustain compensible injuries through defective goods.' One
must also keep in mind that the consumer is not always the buyer, a
matter which has been troublesome, as this discussion will develop.3
* Staff, Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc. LL.B., 1958, Tokyo University.
-* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. A.B., 1935, Denison Univer-
sity; LL.B., 1942, Cincinnati.
In theory, wholesalers and retailers could be held liable under a tort or contract
analysis (see Part IV infra), but a search by the Japanese co-author revealed no
record of a lawsuit against such persons. Presumably, this absence of cases is because
of the extreme difficulty in proving fault on the part of wholesalers and retailers.
In Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Timber Co., 50 Misc. 2d 1055, 272 N.Y.S.2d 227
(1966), a Japanese middleman who supplied nails was held liable, where privity existed,
without reference to the Japanese Law.
' In Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965),
25 Mo. L. REv. 267 (1965), 42 N.D.L. REv. 408 (1966), 41 WAsH. L. REv. 161 (1966),
a bystander was injured by the explosion of a defective shotgun shell. Lack of privity
did not bar his recovery. Contra, Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, 23 App. Div. 2d 530,
256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965). For a general discussion, see Note, 64 COLUm. L. Rv.
916 (1964); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Conminer), 50
M Ni. L. REv. 791, 819 (1966).
'Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), denied re-
covery under UNinom Co mx.nCIAI CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] § 2-318 to an
employee of the purchaser. In Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d
463 (1964), however, an employee in much the same situation was held to be the
buyer, though in all candor the employer was the buyer, having acted through the
medium of the plaintiff. And in a more recent Pennsylvania decision, Webb v.
Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966), a seller was held liable for injuries suffered
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Suffice it here to state that the responsibility of the supplier here con-
templated runs to a buyer of goods and arguably at least to any third
person who may be reasonably expected by the supplier to be harmed
through use of the goods, if they are defective.4
Cases involving personal injury are of most concern because of their
human interest and economic value, so most of the following discussion
relates to those cases. Not to be overlooked, though, is the seller's
liability for economic loss, which is divisible into (1) loss of value of
the goods, 5 and (2) other loss, such as property damage, consequent on
use of the goods.6 A buyer may surely expect, without much fuss, a
return of his purchase price should the goods be defective. Resistance
to the request for compensation may be expected to be directly pro-
portional to the amount of loss claimed.
IL SETTLE ENT BY COURT AND BY THmD PARTY
The Japanese consumer would appear to be much less litigious than
his American counterpart. Too rare are the suits in Japan involving
products liability. Many instances of compensable harm have gone
unredressed because of a reluctance to sue. Products liability cases
are, however, sufficiently numerous in America to warrant particular-
by a bystander when a beer keg, purchased by the injured party's father, exploded.
See Note, 14 CATHOLIC U.L. Rv. 133 (1965).
'The possible plaintiffs may be limited by such things as:
(a) A general principle of foreseeability, as in the case of unusual use of a
product culminating in injuries to persons not typically exposed. See 1 FRuMER &
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILIY § 15.02 (1965). On the general test of foreseeability,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 395 (1965).
(b) A general requirement of privity, as was historically required in tort and is,
to some extent at least, applied in contract or warranty law currently. See Sedgwick,
Conley, & Sleight, Products Liability: Implied Warranties, 48 MARq. L. REv. 139,
152 (1964) ; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS §402A (1965).
(c) The language of a statute, describing protected persons as "buyer," see
UNIFoRm SALES ACT § 15(1), or responsible persons as "seller." See UNnioPaz SALES
ACT § 15; UCC §§ 2-312, 2-313, 2-314.
' In the United States loss of the bargain is directly dealt with by warranty
liability, but liability for negligence and strict liability are in terms of personal
injuries or economic loss consequent upon defects in goods. See UCC § 2-714(2);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 395, 401, 402A (1965).
'Technical rules for protection of the supplier, such as the requirement of privity,
have generally been first abandoned in personal injury cases. Illustrative is Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284(Sup. Ct 1955), 30 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 304 (1956).
In Ohio, for example, as late as 1953, lack of privity barred recovery from the
manufacturer of an electric blanket for damages caused to a bed and house which
burned. Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953). Yet as
early as 1928, personal injuries were recognized as compensable without privity.
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). It was, finally,
in a personal injury case that the Ohio court made its greatest departure from the
privity requirement Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co, 167 Ohio St 244, 147
N.E2d 612 (1958). See also Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Co., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218
N.E.2d 185 (1966).
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ized treatment in textbooks and periodicals.7
The Japanese experience seems to reflect a more general phenome-
non-lawsuits are seldom used in Japan as the means of resolution of
private disputes. The people in Japan apparently do not like to bring
their troubles into court. One reason for this is that lawsuits take at
least a few years to reach their final goals. Further, they are quite
expensive. More to the point, and much more significant however,
seems to be the undeveloped, or underdeveloped (from American
standards), sense of the significance of legal right and wrong. The
people are generally not sympathetic with one who instigates a lawsuit,
and he is frequently told, "You could have found another appropriate
way to settle the trouble without resorting to a lawsuit."
Thus, though the daily papers in Japan cite numerous instances of
injuries for which a supplier would seem to be liable, injured parties
rarely sue. This seemingly underdeveloped sense of legal right and
wrong probably stems from the unfortunate experience suffered as a
consequence of the law's having been a weapon of oppression in the
hands of the ruling class. From feudal society through the days im-
mediately before the war, the law's protection was not a vital reality to
the public. Consequently, when trouble occurs, the injured party
depends on district bosses or administrative authorities for relief.
There are many cases in which the district bosses, civil consultants of
the police, or other central administrators acted as intermediaries.
For instance, in the famous dry milk poisoning case in 1955, a so-called
Five Man Committee (gonin-iinkai), organized through the mediation
of the Ministry of Welfare, expressed an "opinion" which was the
basis for the milk products company's payment of compensation. This
case will be fully discussed later, but it is noteworthy that the milk
products company had promised to fulfill the settlement procedures
indicated by the Committee's "opinion."
8
Such settlements by nonjudicial means require little time or money,
and there is much to be said for them, if they are fair to all concerned.
Generally speaking, however, unlike court decisions, such determina-
tions tend to favor the strong rather than the weak. Consequently,
7 Helpful treatises are FRusER & F=DmAx, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1965); HuRSH,
AmEuCAx LAw oF PRoDucTs LIABILrT'y (1961). "Products Liabilityw' is not yet
recognized by the West Publishing Co.'s American Digest System, but until the
Fourth Decennial Digest (1926-1936) no separate classification was given to Work-
men's Compensation cases either. Beginning sometime after 1960, and not before,
the Index to Legal Periodicals adopted "Products Liability" as a separate subject
classification.8 KAT6, FuiaKfIH6 No K.ENxYr (Study of the law of torts) 162 (1961).
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the damages awarded to the injured party are often small.9 A fair
conclusion, then seems to be that the disadvantages of cost and delay
when resorting to court determination are small in contrast to the often
unfair results of third party mediation.' 0
III. CRImINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPPLIER
A. In America
The American reader will recall that strict criminal liability, which
is comparatively rare, appeared early in the adulterated food cases."
No doubt this kind of liability, along with liability under various food
and drug statutes, is a matter of consequence to involved producers.12
No doubt, further, the quantity of such detailed rules and regulations
would be imposing, even in fields other than food and drug. Still, one
would believe that fear of criminal sanctions, in the sense about to be
emphasized in the following discussion of Japanese law, is not a sub-
stantial factor in the law of products liability in the United States.
In the United States the mens tea concept seems to be at the heart
of the matter, making conviction for a major crime an unlikely con-
sequence of inadvertant error." Illustrative is People v. Stuart, 4
wherein the defendant, a druggist, was charged with manslaughter.
The death was consequent upon the deceased's having taken prescrip-
tion drugs, provided by the defendant, containing sodium nitrate not
called for in the prescription. This lethal drug appears to have been
9 1KAH6, Fu SKSI (Torts) 56, in 22 H6RSTUGAKU ZENSHO (1957).
" The American author has nothing to contribute to the foregoing except to ob-
serve, for the benefit of our Japanese friends, that similar problems face American
courts and litigants. No effort has been made to compare the relative speed of con-
flicts settlement in the two countries, a matter of obvious interest but of equally
obvious difficulty of ascertainment. The frequent resort to commercial arbitration in
America may be ascribed, in part, to dissatisfaction with the judicial process. Even
Shakespeare pondered why more folk do not practice self-destruction rather than
bear "the law's delay."
"See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L. Rav. 55, 64 (1933).
See, e.g., Rosner, Criminal Liability for Deceiving the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, 20 Food DRUG Cosm. L.J. 446 (1965).
"It may be noted, however, that Washington has convicted a druggist of
manslaughter where death resulted from drinking wood alcohol supplied by him
in an unlabeled bottle. State v. Takano, 94 Wash. 119, 162 Pac. 35 (1916). The more
usual American pattern, though, is to require "gross" or "criminal" or some other
pejorative negligence to sustain a manslaughter conviction. See CLARK & MARSHALL,
CRIMES § 5.09 (6th ed. 1958) ; Annot., Criminal Responsibility of Druggist for Death
or Injury in Consequence of Mistake, 55 A.L.R.2d 715 (1957). Washington, among
very few states, supports conviction based upon simple failure to use due care. See, e.g.,
State v. Brubaker, 62 Wn. 2d 964, 385 P.2d 318 (1963) ; State v. Hedges, 8 Wn. 2d 652,
113 P.2d 530 (1941).
447 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956), 55 A.L.R.2d 705.
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mixed with a drug that was called for by the prescription. In short,
the proper drug was adulterated by the presence of the sodium nitrate.
The defendant, though, did not know this, and observation alone would
not have revealed it. The court's opinion adroitly refuses to accept
some appealing arguments of the prosecutor, all pointing toward some
form of strict liability because of a statutory rule.'15 There may well
be strict criminal liability under statute for selling an adulterated drug,
but this does not carry so far as to permit strict criminal responsibility
for the death. This is the kind of decision one would expect generally
in products liability cases in the United States. Violation of some
strictly apposite technical rule will be punished, but application of a
broader rule of law, involving substantial criminal penalties, will be
precluded unless mens rea is present.
B. In Japan
There are few Japanese examples of penal cases culminating from
defective products. When a consumer is killed or injured because of
defects in merchandise, however, the manufacturer may be subject to
article 211 of the Japanese Criminal Code,'16 punishing accidental hom-
icide and injury in the conduct of a business. The rarity of the cases
arising under article 211 is probably due to procuratorial decisions
against prosecution or to private negotiations.
In the summer of 1955, however, the Chfigoku and Shikoku dis-
tricts of Japan were visited by a strange disease affecting infants.
Great was the shock when it was recognized that the disease was
traceable to dry milk manufactured by the Tokushima works of one of
Japan's chief dairy products companies, Morinaga. A total of 113
persons died and 11,778 were injured through consumption of the
product.17 The general manager and production manager of the Tok-
'The opinion was well-written, as is his custom, by California Chief Justice
Traynor whose role in the area of products liability has been monumental. Much
of the common law of strict products liability can be traced to his decisions. E.g.,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rep. 697, 377 P.2d 897(1962). Thus, it is significant that he would not impose strict criminal responsibility.
"JAPANEsE CR=nNA CODE art. 211:
A person, who fails to use such care as is required in the performance of
profession, occupation or routines and thereby kills or injures another, shall be
punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more
than one thousand yen....[Translation from 2 Eibun h6reisha Law Bulletin Series No. 2400 (1965), herein-
after cited as EHS.] The fine is now fifty times the figure there stated. Bakkint
rinjisochilh5 (Temporary fines administration law) art. 3 (Law No. 251, 1948) in
2 EHS No. 2402 (1965).
"Morinaga funnvi- chadoka jiken no hosht0 ni kansuru iken ho (Opinion on
the compensation in the Morinaga powdered milk poisoning case), 103 JussuTo
49 (1956) ; KATO, op. cit. supra note 8, at 162.
M4SHINGTON LAW REVIEW[
ushima works were charged with accidental homicide under the above
cited Criminal Code provision, the theory being that the deaths were
due to arsenic poisoning, and that arsenic had entered the product
through its use as a stabilizer of sodium phosphate. The prosecutor
contended that since the dry milk was intended for babies, both defen-
dants were under an absolute duty to prevent harmful materials from
entering the mixture. Further, since the chemical used was not one
generally used in food products, but was used mainly for industrial
purposes, the defendants should have been aware that such a product
might not be free of harmful contaminants. Thus, the defendants, if
they were to use sodium phosphate, had a duty to insure that it was
free of contaminants. Such duty includes investigating the manufac-
turer's processes, or obtaining an analysis certificate. According to
the prosecutor, the defendants should have at least checked the chem-
ical's color, form, and purity by chemical analysis.
After a long-continued trial, the Tokushima District Court on Octo-
ber 25, 1963, held that the defendants were innocent.' As to alleged
negligence in ordering the chemical, the court opined that the defen-
dants were not under a duty to use only chemicals listed in the
Japanese pharmacopoeia, nor were they under a duty to investigate the
supplier's processes. Further, they were not obligated to insist upon a
chemical analysis certificate. Regarding negligence after the defen-
dants had received the materials, the court held that it was natural
that they had assumed and believed that the chemicals supplied were of
the same quality as those previously supplied, and, absent some spe-
cial reason, they were under no duty to test. There might have been a
duty to test had there been reason to doubt the quality of the product,
but not otherwise.' 9 The judgment of the district court has been gen-
erally approved by Japanese legal scholars.20
Accidental crimes are difficult to analyze under any legal system,
but under Japanese law it is quite clear that the defendant will be held
culpable only if he is found to have been negligent.2 ' This involves
perhaps two aspects: first, it must be determined whether the defen-
5 Kakyfi keishfi 977 (Tokushima Dist. Ct., Oct. 25, 1963).
"The case is still pending on appeal. [Subsequent to this writing the Takamatsu
High Court reversed and remanded the case to the Tokushima District Court; the
official text of the High Court decision is not yet available, so the basis of the
reversal cannot now be told.-Ed.]
o See, e.g., Inoue, Morinaga dorai ,liruku chadoku fiken no Ianketsu (Decision in
the Morinaga powdered milk poisoning case) (pts. 1-2), 36 H6arTsU Jm6, March
1964, p. 65; April 1964, p. 66.
INoTE, HANREI NI ARAWARETA KASHITSUHAN NO RIaON (The theory of criminal
negligence in case law) 29-30 (1962).
[ VOL. 42: 483
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dant could objectively foresee the results which occurred. If he could
not, the defendant is innocent. If he could, then a second question is
presented: what could the defendant have done to avoid the results?
The test will usually be that of an ordinary man, but if the defendant
conducted a business, the court will evaluate his conduct in light of his
experience and expertise as a businessman. A businessman is deemed
to foresee more clouded risks and imagine more varieties of evasive
action. In Japan, as in common-law countries, there is no criminal
culpability for pure mischance. Thus, in the milk case, the district
court's judgment is reasonable, for there was no foreseeability of the
result even on the standard of businessmen with the defendants' ex-
perience.
In summary, then, the American and Japanese law with respect to
criminal liability would probably have resulted in identical decisions
in each of the cases cited. The American law, based upon English
precedent, has apparently tended to require something (intensely hard
to identify) above and beyond simple carelessness as a basis for cul-
pability in the manslaughter or "negligent homicide" cases. In Japan,
and in some American states, any failure to exercise due care is
sufficient for culpability for consequential deaths or injuries.
IV. Civni LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER IN JAPAN-
BACKGROUND
Under Japanese law the manufacturer may be civilly liable in either
or both of two ways: tort or contract.
A. Tort Liability
Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code provides: "A person who
violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is bound to
make compensation for damage arising therefrom."22
It is obvious that defects are actionable under this provision if they
are traceable to the manufacturer's negligence or if they are the means
he has selected to inflict intentional harm.
B. Contract Liability
Article 415 of the Japanese Civil Code provides, in part: "If an
obligor fails to effect performance in accordance with the tenor and
purport of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages .... "
'This translation, and those of Japanese Civil Code provisions which follow,
are taken from 2 EHS No. 2100 (1966).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Under this section, if a "warranty" is expressly agreed upon by the
parties to a sales contract, breach of such provision would give rise to
breach of contract.23 Thus, if a seller should warrant to the buyer that
the goods are free from defects, but in fact the goods are defective,
the seller has breached his promise to provide goods free from defects.
If the defect causes a foreseeable personal injury, the injured party
can recover damages-at least theoretically-from the seller. Of
course, as in all contract actions, ihere must be privity of contract
between the injured party and the warrantor.
It is evident that to recover under article 415 the "warranty" must
be a contractual provision agreed upon by the parties. Unlike Amer-
ican law, Japanese law does not imply in sales contracts a warranty
that the goods will be free from defects. The Japanese doctrine which
is perhaps closest to what Americans would term "implied warranty"
is the principle of Latent Defects (kashi tampo). Derived from Civil
Code article 570,24 the principle of latent defects has been judicially
construed to imply standards of quality in situations where American
courts might reach the same result with resort to implied warrantiesY-
But, as is the case under article 415, a party must be in privity of
contract to benefit from any implied standard of quality.
C. Concurrence of Tort and Contract Liability
As stated, contract liability requires privity; tort liability does not.
In any case, then, where privity exists and where fault (negligence or
intention to inflict harm) on the manufacturer's part can be shown,
the consumer has remedies in both tort and contract.20 Thus, there
21 The scope of damages arising from breach of contract is defined in JAPANESE
C L CODE art. 416:
(1) A demand of compensation for damages shall be for the compensation by
the obligor of such damages as would ordinarily arise from the non-performance
of an obligation.
(2) The obligee may recover the damages which have arisen through special
circumstances too, if the parties had foreseen or could have foreseen such cir-
cumstances.
'JAPANESE CIVIt CODE art. 570: "If any latent defects exist in the object of a
sale, the provisions of Article 566 shall apply ." Article 566 provides essentially
that when the buyer is unaware that the object of sale is encumbered, and because
of such encumbrance the object of the contract cannot be attained, the buyer is
entitled to rescission. When the object of the contract can be attained despite
encumbered goods, the buyer cannot rescind, but he is entitled to claim damages.
I For detailed discussions of kashi tampo liability elsewhere in this symposium, see
Kanzaki & Jones, Problems of Performance of Sales Contracts Under Japanese and
American Law, 42 WASH. L. REv. 415, 423-26 (1967); Akamatsu & Bonneville,
Disclainers of Warranty, Limitation of Liability, and Liquidation of Damages in Sales
Transactions, 42 WAsHa. L. REv. 509, 513-23 (1967).
" KAT6, op. cit. supra note 9, at 46-48.
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are concurrent theories of responsibility, giving the option, according
to the Japanese courts and most legal scholars, to pursue either ap-
proach, or both. There is a minority scholars' view, however, which
argues that absent an intention to inflict harm the contractual remedy
should be exclusive. The argument is that general tort principles
should not be applied to situations where the parties have placed
themselves in a contractual relationship; rather, contract laws should
govern the parties' rights and duties to each other since their contract
attempts to define these rights and duties.
D. Comparison of Tort and Contract Liability
There are certain similarities in applying either Japanese tort or
contract liability: (1) In neither tort nor contract is the manufacturer
liable absent negligence or the intention to inflict harm. The language
of Civil Code article 709 quoted above makes this quite clear in the
case of tort liability, but it is less clear insofar as liability in contract
is concerned.17 Recent judicial opinions and scholarly expressions of
opinion, though, have unanimously required one or the other as a basis
of liability.28 (2) Civil Code article 416, specifying the reasonable
sequence of cause and effect as a limitation on the range of damages,
applies to both forms of liability.
On the other hand, there are significant differences in Japanese tort
and contract liabilities: (1) In the case of tort liability, the plaintiff
(consumer) has the burden of establishing the existence of negligence
or intentionally inflicted harm. That is to say, he must carry the bur-
den of proof of showing fault. In contract liability, on the other hand,
the defendant (manufacturer) bears the burden of showing that there
was no negligence. (2) The Japanese Civil Code extinguishes tort
claims at the expiration of three years from the discovery of the in-
' The requirement of negligence under article 415 arises by implication. In ad-
dition to that portion quoted in the text supra, article 415 provides: "the same
shall apply in cases where performance becomes impossible for any cause for which
the obligor is responsible."
The term "neglience," as used in this discussion, requires some explanation
to the American reader. "Fault" or "responsibility" might have been used; however,
the degree of fault or responsibility on the obligor's part necessary to impose article
415 liability is such that it closely resembles what Americans would term "neg-
ligence."
Ishimoto, Kashitse no _yken (Elements of negligence), in 9 S6G6 HANREI
KENKYO saSHo, MIm.NP5 (Comprehensive case study series, civil law) 3-4 (1964).
This concept, strange to American readers, appears to have been (and to some
extent still to be) a fundamental postulate of civil law. See Kessler, The Protection
of the Consumer under Modern Sales Law, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J. 262, 272-77 (1964).
1967]
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juries,29 but in contract claims the statutory period of limitations is ten
years.30
On the basis of this comparison it would seem that persons injured
by defective products would prefer to seek redress on the contractual
liability theory, since the defendant would have the burden of proving
lack of fault on his part and because the statute of limitations is
longer. Yet, the authors have found no reported Japanese cases allow-
ing a products liability recovery based on breach of contract. This is
perhaps explained by the privity requirement. For all practical pur-
poses, this obstacle is insurmountable even where there is an express
warranty of quality, or where such warranty is implied under the latent
defects principle. The person injured by a defective product would
seldom, if ever, be fortunate enough to be a party to the sales contract
giving rise to the warranty of quality, whether such warranty be express
or implied.
V. CiviL LIABILITY OF THE SUPPLIER IN AMERIcA-BACKGROUND
Obvious differences among the various jurisdictions make a general-
ization vague, misleading, or both. Further, if it is really true that the
"dam" which has heretofore pent up consumers in their quest for
compensation has "busted,"'" even an accurate statement of what the
law now is in most states will hardly be meaningful tomorrow. With
these cautions, one may make a broad comparison between the Japa-
nese law just related and the law in the United States.
The distinction between "contract" and "tort" liability is, to the
eyes of proponents of increased manufacturer's liability, becoming
less and less clear.2 The reason for this is that each theory, taken
' JAPANESE CIVI CODE art. 724:
The right to demand compensation for the damage which has arisen from an
unlawful act shall lapse by prescription if not exercised within three years from
the time when the injured party or his legal representative became aware of
such damage and of the identity of the person who caused it, the same shall
apply if twenty years have elapsed from the time when the unlawful act was
committed.
"' JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art 167:
(1) A claim shall lapse if it is not exercised for ten years.
(2) A property right other than a claim or ownership shall lapse if it is not
exercised for twenty years.
"Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consmner) 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1113 (1960). This article is a modem classic and a departure point for most
of the current trends in products liability.
See, e.g., RESTATEMIENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A, comment ot (1965):
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the liability, have resorted
to a "warranty" .... In some instances this theory has proved to be an unfortu-
nate one. Although warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability, and
it is generally agreed that a tort action will still lie for its breach, it has be-
[ VOL. 42: 483
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alone, puts obstacles in the way of plaintiff's recovery, yet each tends
to remove the obstacles posed by the other. 3
If negligence is the basis for the liability sought to be imposed, the
plaintiff must establish with some particularization just how the defen-
dant failed to exercise due care. The fault may lie in design"s or in
manufacturing process,'5 or in failure to warn or instruct about con-
ditions of use,3' but fault there must be. To this extent, then, American
law and Japanese law are similar. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may
supply part of the plaintiffIs case,' and here the analogy to the Japanese
law of contract liability is striking. If the defect is one that would not
have been found had due care been exercised, let the defendant (man-
ufacturer or seller) show that he did exercise due care and, in spite of
that, the defect appeared. This doctrine, though, has been viewed as
insufficient protection to the consumer, if for no other reason than that
it tends to minimize verdict amounts against suppliers who have estab-
lished compliance with commonly accepted performance standards.3
come so identified in practice with a contract of sale between the plaintiff and
defendant that the warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the
recognition of strict liability where there is no such contract. There is nothing
in this Section which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as
a matter of "warranty" to the user and consumer. But if this is done, it should
be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of
warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not
subject to the various contract rules.
'See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 364-65 (1965).
' See, e.g., 1 FRumER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 7; Baur, Mfanu-facturer's Liability for Negligcnt Design, 14 DRAKE L. REv. 117 (1964); Noel,
Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warn-
ings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Direc-
tions for Use of Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
The manufacturer is not an insurer that his product will injure no one. Thus a
boy who walked into an automobile was denied recovery for the loss of an eye
caused by a protruding ornament in Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393,
329 P.2d 605 (1958). See also 1 FRumE & FIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 7.01(3).
There must be the foreseeability of more than trivial harm. See Noel, Recent
Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or WTarnigs. 19
Sw. L.J. 43, 45 (1965). The manufacturer must use reasonable care, including care
in basic design, to prevent such harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 395(1965), particularly comment f.
See 1 FRuuun & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 6.
See 1 Hr n, AMERICAN LAw oF PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 2.28-.39 (1961). In Hub-
bard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965), the court dealt with a
rather long and detailed warning, which explained that the product (an insecticide)
might be fatal, if swallowed, and gave instructions as to use. The very length and detail
of the warning may have been the undoing of the manufacturer, because it was held
liable to the estate of a non-English speaking farm laborer. In substance, a skull and
cross-bones might have been more helpful, because the use by uneducated farm laborers
ought to have been foreseen. See Note, 15 DR PAUL L. REv. 211 (1965). See also
Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1965).
See P. Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negli-
gence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 35 (1965).
' See Prosser, supra note 31, at 1116.
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The warranty liability of the American manufacturer or seller is not
predicated on blameworthy conduct. 9 A supplier may, indeed, estab-
lish beyond peradventure of doubt that he exercised reasonable care
to perfect his product, and yet if it is not as warranted, the liability is
his.40 This is not to say that express representations, such as those in
advertising, may not establish a norm for the product,4 but it is to
observe that the increase in supplier liability has resulted from im-
position of warranty quite independent of his express agreement.
The source of the implied warranty liability is itself obscure, but for
our purpose it may be traced to statutory enactments, now primarily
the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as UCC],
though formerly traceable to the Uniform Sales Act, and to judicial
pronouncements. The point to be observed is that however complete
the warranties stated by statute may appear, there is always the
possibility of a court's implying new and greater promises about the
goods. In the imposition of liability upon food processors one may
find a particularly marked example, for no court is seriously hampered
in finding a warranty that food will be fit for consumption without
regard to any of the statutory niceties of warranty.42
'This mid-Victorian sounding phrase is used to evade what may be a semantic
trap. Had the word "fault" been used, it might have misled. Fault there must be,
in the sense of a faulty product, but fault there need not be, in the sense of omission
of conduct which would have prevented harm. It has been stated that "the mere act
of putting a faulty product on the market constitutes fault in this understanding of
the term." Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1089 (1965).
The use of the term "blameworthy conduct" may be unfortunate, in that it raises
moral overtones. No such overtones are intended; the supplier is blameworthy if he
fails to live up to the standards expected of a reasonably prudent supplier. This kind
of liability may be liability without moral fault. See Lucey, Liability Without
Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENr. L. REv. 952, 954 (1957).
'The meaningful warranties, within the context of this article, are those im-
plied by law, namely the warranty of merchantability, under UNIFORTM SALES ACT
§ 15 and UCC § 2-314; and the warranty of fitness for a buyer's particular purpose
under UNIrom SALES AcT § 15 (1) and UCC § 2-315.
"As under UNIFoRm SALEs AcT §§ 12, 14 or under UCC § 2-313.
"The requirement of privity, backstopped by the words of the Uniform Sales
Act that warranty liability is that of a "seller," might obviously mean that absent
the seller-buyer relationship, no warranty liability ought to be imposed. See, e.g.,
UNiFoRm SALE~s Acr § 12. Beginning with a celebrated Washington decision,
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913), courts have sur-
mounted the subtleties of this principle by finding a warranty impervious to this
limitation. Similarly, courts (and Washington again provides an illustration)
skirt the technical statutory requirement of notice of breach of warranty under the
Uniform Sales Act by deciding that this technicality is inapposite to a suit for
defective foodstuffs where the defendant is a remote supplier. This time, though,
the temptation is to rely on the sales act's use of the word "seller" in expressing
warranty liability to demonstrate that the sales act's technicalities protect sellers
and not more remote suppliers. See LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wn. 2d
645, 314 P2d 421 (1957).
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Warranty liability, however, has not been the open sesame to re-
covery that one might anticipate from a nonfault principle. The re-
quirement of privity, a factor under Japanese law, is an oft-told story
in America. Suffice for here and now that in some states the ultimate
consumer who has not dealt contractually with the defendant is legally
unable to enforce a warranty, because "privity" is lacking.43
Certain other technicalities, traceable for the most part to statutory
provisions, also can be conjured up to block a products liability re-
covery. They are familiar: (1) the requirement of notice of the
breach;44 (2) the power of the defendant to limit or exclude liability by
contractual disclaimer; 45 (3) the extent to which reliance on the war-
ranty as the defendant's undertaking is essential;46 and, (4) even
though warranty liability sounds like contract language, to what extent
may it be eliminated or reduced by consumer misuse-call it what you
'SIn R. H. Macy & Co. v. Vest, 111 Ga. App. 85, 140 S.E.2d 491 (1965), absence
of privity precluded recovery by a plaintiff, who was burned by a flammable article
of clothing, purchased by her mother as a gift for her. The decision did not involve
UCC § 2-318. A contrary decision would be anticipated in most states. See Brown
v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (flammable hula skirt; seller liable to
burned plaintiff, even though purchase had been made by an aunt and loaned to the
plaintiff).
"Both UN FORM SALEs Act § 49 and UCC § 2-607 require notice of the breach.
VoLD, SALEs § 95 (2d ed. 1959). In theory, failure to notify deprives the buyer of
any cause of action he may otherwise have had against the seller. In practice, this is
not always true, because the courts are wont to by-pass the rule someway, as by
limiting the requirement to instances of commercial loss. See 2 FgumYR & FRm=-
MAX, PIODUctS LIABrTY § 19.05 (1965). Somewhat less sweeping in its generosity,
but still protective of the consumer who sustains personal injury, is the rule which
limits the notice requirement to situations where privity exists. Wilson v. Modern
Mobile Homes, 376 Mich. 342, 137 N.W.2d 144 (1965); Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen,
64 Wn. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964) ; LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wn. 2d
645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
One of the present writers once concluded that the notice requirement of the UCC
would not be so readily circumvented. Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in
Iashington. and the Uniform Commnercial Code, 36 WASH. L. REv. 50, 79 (1961).
This enthusiastic welcome of the notice requirement has not been universal, how-
ever. See Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Priity' Statute: Strict Products Liability
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. Rav. 804, 835 (1965).
'This is the subject of another paper in this symposium. The extent to which a
disclaimer is valid against "strict liability" is a matter in which the cases seem too
few to identify a categorical rule. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Air-
craft Co., 47 Cal. Rep. 518 (App. Div. 1965) (absence of personal injury may be a
factor). The paradoxical permission of disclaimers at a time when greater con-
sumer protection is in vogue is analyzed in Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in
Consumer Sales, 77 HA~v. L. Ray. 318 (1963).
"This, by way of illustration, seems to be the nub of the matter in wholesaler's
liability. He is really a conduit for products whose quality he does not in fact
control and whose identity is usually unknown to the consumer until injuries are
sustained and a lawyer traces the product through its tortuous course from drawing
table to breakfast table. See 1 FRUMER & FRiEDIAN, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 16.03(3),
16.04(2); 2 id. at § 19.01(3). Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305
(1945), refused to imply a warranty against a wholesaler.
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will? To speak of contributory negligence at this point is asymmetrical,
but the problem is there in some guise.47
Thus, though the injured plaintiff is free from the necessity of
identifying how the defendant was at fault, and thus in a strategic
position superior by far to that provided by res ipsa loquitur, he is
likely to find some combination of the standard warranty defenses, said
to be predicated on the contractual nature of that liability, to present
an insurmountable obstacle.
The American law seems to be in the midst of a dramatic break-
through toward increased consumer protection. While there are
learned men who are convinced that the negligence and warranty com-
bination, with their limits, are working well, most experts seem to feel
the need for a principle permitting surer recovery by the consumer.
The issue may be stated in terms of whether or not a supplier ought
to bear the risk of injury due to defects in his product which, regret-
tably but practically, cannot be eradicated from any human process.
There are sufficient ambiguities in this general formulation of the issue
to make it virtually useless as a major premise for resolving a parti-
cular dispute. The real heart of the matter, though, is in identifying
those defects which cannot "practically" be eliminated from the pro-
duction process. The present differences between the proponents of the
fault and nonfault liability concepts center here. If fault, the usual
sine qua non of tort liability, is to be the basis of products liability,
why charge the manufacturer who has done all that is reasonable and
economically practicable to remove the defect which slips inexorably
through his fine net of precautions? How can such liability motivate
him to improve his product when, by hypothesis, he is already doing
what the highest level of performance demands?48
The nonfault proponents have turned to other areas of policy. Find-
ing it socially desirable to spread unavoidable risk by charging the
person who is seeking and enjoying economic gain through the distri-
bution of the product, they rely on the producer to transmit the cost
" Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965), 4 A.L.R. 3d
501. See Sedgwick, Conley & Sleight, Products Liability: Implied Warranties,
48 MARQ. L. REV. 139, 154-61 (1964). Misuse by the consumer may take him outside
the scope of the warranty, even though a jurisdiction does not apply assumption of
risk or contributory negligence to warranty actions. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products-An Opposing View. 24 TENN. L. REv. 938. 945 (1957). Contra, Horn
& Scarritt, Products Liability: Doctrinal Problems and the Restatement's Answer
17 U. FLA. L. REV. 421, 444 (1964).
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to the consumer.49 Certain assumptions may lurk here too, in that not
every supplier is economically big and not every consumer is, on the
same measure, small.50 Efforts to analogize this to insurance are
stifling, for the premiums seem to be collected after the event. Fur-
ther, the premiums do not necessarily reflect actuarial determinations.5 1
Witness the disturbing plight of the allergic. Whether he is compen-
sated or not,52 no one seems to suggest a multiple price structure for
goods with a high price to allergic users, a low price to known non-
allergics, and a medium price to the unidentified. Our market economy
is not yet sensitive enough to thus discriminate, and the battle will be
lost if the issue as to who bears the risk of loss from injury through de-
fective products is required to await development of such mathematical
niceties.' 3
Two significant American doctrinal developments mark today's
products liability law: first, the warranty provisions of the UCC, and
second, section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts [hereinafter
referred to as Restatement]. The first has taken mincing steps toward
greater consumer protection; the second has stamped heavily into the
fray. In substance, the UCC provides warranty protection, yet con-
tains the framework of manufacturer protection by: (1) permitting
disclaimer; 4 (2) requiring notice;" and (3) taking no position on a
major aspect of privity."I The UCC has no provision respecting neg-
ligence liability. The Restatement, on the other hand, recognizes the
possibility of negligence liability, 7 but adopts a theory of "simple
4 See, e.g., Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rnv. 363, 366 (1965).
' See Smyser, Products Liability and the Anerican Law Institute: A Petition
for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343, 349 (1965).
" The "premiums" referred to are the costs to the consumer included in the price
of the goods. The existence of products liability insurance demonstrates that such
risks are subject to actuarial technology from the manufacturer's point of view. See
Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-the Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961). Morris suggests that the allocation among
consumers of the risks of harm through use of goods by including the cost in the
price lumps all consumers in a single class, without regard to any variance in risk
of injury through use.
" See Traynor, supra note 49, at 369.
'a The need for additional economic data has been emphasized as a reason against
adoption of the strict liability principle. See Plant, supra note 48, at 947. In
essence, this is an argument predicated on the burden of proof. The same economic
data are essential to decide whether we ought to retain the status quo.
ri UCC § 2-316.
LZ UCC § 2-607.
r' UCC § 2-318. This provision deals with the relationship between certain persons,
intimately connected with the purchaser, who are protected by the warranty. It does
not, however, take a position on the basic privity gap between the consumer and whole-
salers and manufacturers with whom no contract is made. See UCC § 2-318, comment 3.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 395, 404, 406 (1965).
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strict" liability,5 free from any need for proof of faulty handling (but
not, it must be emphasized, of faulty product)"9 and totally free of the
niceties of warranty liability retained by the UCC. ° The literature on
this development is not insubstantial, with arguments pro and con."1
Perhaps the most serious challenge has nothing to do (on face) with
the substantive rule announced, but with the integrity of the announced
rule as a "restatement."6  Carpers might prefer "reshapement." The
minimal evidentiary demands placed on a plaintiff in a strict liability
case are feared by some as an encouragement to fraud.13
Strict liability is predicated on the existence of a defect in the
product. 4 A full exploration of the significance of this requirement
is essential to an appraisal of the doctrine, but would overly extend
this paper. In the clearest of cases, though, one can imagine the
presence of an imperfection in a manufactured product which marks
that particular item as substandard. The defect may be a foreign
substance in food, or a weakened structural part of an automobile,6 or
a defectively soldered joint in an electronic product. Most of the
celebrated cases have been of this type--occasional items which have
contained defects because of a miscarriage in the production scheme.0
The strict liability doctrine has extended, however, to products
' The phrase is explained in Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability,
17 Bus. LAW. 157 (1961).
See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965).
See RESTATERENT (SEcoNr), TORTS § 402A, comment in (1965).
6 At the risk of serious omission, one would list the following articles as those
substantially helpful: P. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAs L. REV. 855 (1963) ; Lascher, Strict Liability
in Tort for Defective Products: the Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CA!.
L. Rxv. 30 (1965); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict
Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturersfor Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-an Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. Ry.E.
938 (1957); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 60 Miiqiw. L. Rav. 791 (1966); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity"
Statute: Strict Products Liability under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L.
REv. 804 (1965) ; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5 (1965).
See Smyser, supra note 50, at 345.
See Plant, supra note 61, at 949.
The extent to which the plaintiff will bear the burden of identifying the defect
and establishing its existence at the time it left the defendant's hands will, of
course, be a major factor in extending or limiting the impact of the strict liability
concept. The mere fact of injury does not establish existence of a defect. Nor does
existence of a defect at some time establish that it is traceable to the particular
defendant. Nor does existence of a defect traceable to the defendant necessarily
equate to liability since the defect must relate causally to the injuries sustained.
The recent Michigan decision in Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135
N.W2d 388 (1965), 45 NEB. L. REv. 189 (1966), provides an illustration of what
seems to be a reasonable relaxation of the burden facing the plaintiff to particularize
the defect claimed to exist in a product.
' Prof. Plant concisely analyzes the impact of strict liability in such a case in
his article, supra note 61, at 942.
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which were faulty in design, where the defect was a characteristic of
the generic product.67 Beyond that is the application of the doctrine to
the product which is in fact dangerous, but whose danger is undreamed
of in the collective knowledge of mankind. 5  The current cigarette
controversy is illustrative 9 Once the imminence of the risk is gen-
erally known to consumer and manufacturer, assumption of the risk
would seem to bar recovery. At a time prior to general knowledge of
the risk, while scientific information is of limited dispersion, it would
seem that the manufacturer may be required to know of risks identi-
fied in available literature, mayhap even in a foreign tongue.7" But
until the risk is identified by someone, somewhere, it is a conundrum
worthy of Solomon to decide where the risk should lie. Modern mir-
acle drugs and processes may have unsuspected side effects of awesome
magnitude on some unidentifiable group of users. The wholesome
effect on the rest of mankind dictates, one would think, that develop-
ment and use of the product are to be fostered. But one is reluctant at
this point to predict that the current precepts of our economy are so
infallibly just as to demand that the protection of the entrepreneur is
of greater social value than is the protection of the occasional victim.
This kind of risk may be the very one which must be spread as
broadly as possible throughout all society to assuage the suffering of
the few, borne for the greater good of the many.71
This doctrine of strict liability, divorced from overtones of warranty,
'E.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Putnam v. Erie
City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d
9, 45 Cal. Rep. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965) ; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d
256, 37 Cal. Rep. 896, 391 P2d 168 (1964) ; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d
383 (1965), 45 NE. L. REv. 189 (1966); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 75 A.L.R.2d 1; Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc.,
23 App. Div. 2d. 530, 256 N.Y.S2d 643 (1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instr. Corp.,
12 N.Y2d 432, 191 N.E2d 81, 230 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Wights v. Staff Jennings,
Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965).
Faulty design cases in which strict liability has been imposed are: Canifax
v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rep. 552 (Dist. Ct App. 1965) ;
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rep. 697, 377 P2d 897
(1963). See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965).
"See RESTATEENT (SECoND), TORTS §402A, comment i (1965); P. Keeton,
Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect,
41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963).
' See P. Keeton, supra note 68, at 868; O'Donnell, Cigarettes, Cancer and the
Implied lVarranty of Wholesomeness, 13 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 40 (1964); Siler,
Legal Liability if Tobacco Products Cases, 53 Ky. L.J. 712 (1965).
1' See P. Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence,
49 VA. L. REv. 675, 678 (1963).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965), will not extend
liability to such products. See P. Keeton, supra note 68, at 867; James, The Untoward
Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALI.
L. REv. 1551 (1966).
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is in its infancy. Its limits are only adumbrated in the current liter-
ature, vast though it is. The existence of the doctrine is, as will be
observed, not unknown in Japan, but the inroads it has made in
American products liability law bear no Japanese counterpart. There
probably are American jurisdictions whose present law more nearly
resembles the Japanese law than the generalized statement of the
strict liability concept here essayed. Negligence, warranty, and strict
liability will all retain utility in the foreseeable future.
Their utility will vary somewhat, depending upon the role played
by the supplier. The manufacturer, protected as he often is from
warranty liability, is in many cases more readily chargeable with
negligence. The retailer, on the other hand, is frequently in no position
to control the quality of the goods (such as food in sealed containers),
but can bear the brunt of warranty liability from the economic stand-
point. Strict liability seems to view these participants in the distri-
bution of goods on a par, so long as the goods are shown to have been
defective at the time they left the hands of the particular supplier in-
volved.7"
In particular detail, there are other signal points of comparison
between the Japanese law here outlined and that found in American
jurisdictions. Insofar as compensable damages are concerned, one has
no reason to foresee any substantial difference between American and
Japanese law. Consequential damages, such as personal injury or
property damage, proximately flowing from proper use of a dangerous
and defective product, are recoverable in America under the various
liability theories.73 Where the only damages suffered reflect the dif-
ference in value between what was promised and what was delivered,
no problem is foreseen, save for the reminder that the rule stated by
the Restatement is not applicable, so technical sales warranty rules
may be applicable. 4
2 Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rep. 552 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965).
' See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 67 Wn. 2d 278, 407 P.2d 461 (1965).
' Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rep. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
Price v. Gatlin & Columbia Tractor & Imp. Co., 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
There is a recent celebrated holding that the privity rule may not be applicable in
such cases, marking an extension of the elimination of that requirement. Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See also Rapson,
Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuTGEs L. REv. 692 (1965);
Note, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 715 (1965); Cumming, Manufacturer's Responsibility for
Defective Products: Continuing Controversy Over the Law to be Applied, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1681 (1966). By the weight of authority the loss of the benefit of the bargain
is not recoverable in a negligence action. See Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio
St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
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The statute of limitations, too, may be expected to shift somewhat,
depending upon whether relief is predicated on warranty under the
UCC or on the theory of the Restatemen.7 5 In due time, one would
predict that this too shall pass and that some universally applicable
prescription period will be found.
VI. TORT LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER
A. In General
In Japan, where privity is indispensable to contract liability, the
consumer is typically forced to rely on a manufacturer's negligence if
recovery is to be enjoyed. In some tort areas Japan does recognize
strict liability-imposing liability without negligence." This has not,
though, been applied to products liability.
Once the defendant's negligence has been established under Japa-
nese law, there is usually no need to find some form of aggravated
negligence. In a case wherein the consumer has been negligent, how-
ever, liability of the manufacturer may have to rest upon the inten-
tional infliction of harm, or on a showing that his negligence was
comparatively greater than that of the plaintiff.1
In Japan there are two circumstances justifying a finding of neg-
ligence. (1) The defendant failed to prevent harm because he did not
foresee that harm, though he should have foreseen it. In short, the
defendant must foresee what an ordinary person in defendant's posi-
tion would have foreseen. Thus, if the defendant undertakes to per-
form a particular role or occupation, he will be tested by what the
ordinary person in that occupation would foresee.78 (2) The defen-
dant did not take appropriate action to prevent the occurrence of
' See Rapson, supra note 74 at 704. In Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 93 N.J.
Super. 49, 224 A.2d 689 (1966), the warranty theory of limitations was applied to strict
liability. Cf. Shahade v. Clairol, Inc., PRoD. LmImiTY REP. ff 5673 (U.S.D.C. Conn.
1966).SE.g., the owner of a business operating a nuclear reactor in Japan is strictly
liable for personal injuries resulting from such operation, with some exceptions.
Gcnshirvolu songai no baisho ni kosuru hiritsu (Law concerning reparation of
injury due to nuclear radiation) (Law No. 1140 of 1961). See also TANIGUCHI
& UEBAYASHI, SONGAI BAISH611o GAISETSU (Outline of the law of damages) 17, 19
(1964): "Thus, in Japan we can find some legislation recognizing strict liability,
but compared to other countries the scope of recognized strict liability is exceedingly
narrow."
'The American lawyer will recognize this as comparative negligence, usually
ignored in favor of a rule of contributory negligence. See 1 FRumER & FRIEDAN,
PRODucTs LiABmiry § 13 (1965).
" The American lawyer will identify the reasonably prudent man. See Products
Liability-The New Frontier, 13 FEDERAT N IN S. Coux. Q. 7, 21, 38 (1963).
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harm he did foresee. Again, the standard is that of an ordinary man in
the position of the defendant.
These two circumstances set the predicates for products liability in
tort. There is no reason to distinguish negligence in the operation of
a business from ordinary negligence, insofar as tort liability is con-
cerned, though such a distinction may be relevant to criminal lia-
bility.79 Of course, the manufacturer will be held to the expertise
prevalent in the trade, and this might impose liability in instances in
which an unskilled layman would not be held. There are, indeed,
certain products such as food, drugs, toys, and machinery whose man-
ufacturers are under severe responsibility because of the dangerous
nature of the product.3 0
B. Tort Liability of the Food Processor
In Japan, there are occasional, and increasingly frequent, sugges-
tions that strict liability ought to be imposed on the food processor.
However, the present Japanese Civil Code's principle of negligence
liability encompasses the food cases along with all other products.
As yet, there is no civil judgment in Japan imposing liability on the
food manufacturer.
In the milk products case, the criminal aspect of which has been
previously alluded to,"' some seventy persons instituted civil suits for
damages, but voluntarily dismissed their actions.8 2 The stated reason
for withdrawal of the actions was that plaintiffs' doctors' fees, other
medical costs, and court costs were paid by the manufacturer, pur-
suant to the opinion of the "Five Man Committee." The date of the
withdrawal, though, seems significant, for it was after the decision in
the criminal case; the plaintiffs may have withdrawn their actions
' Shinomiya, Gyomujo no kashitsu (Negligence in the conduct of business), 9 Soi5
HANREI KENKYU SOSHO, MImPO 97 (1964).
It might be noted that at one time in Japan a combined criminal proceeding and
tort action was recognized. 4 SuaHnmo & TANAKA, H6VrrSUGAKU JITTEN (Dictionary
of jurisprudence) 2329-34 (1936). In 1880 the Japanese criminal procedure law
adopted the system of an incidental private action after Code d'instruction criminelle
(1808) of France. Thus, the former Japanese Criminal Procedure Code article 567
(Law No. 75, 1922) provided: "A person who has been injured in body, freedom,
reputation or property by an offence or offences may sue the accused incidentally
to the criminal procedure for a claim or claims caused by the offence or offences."
This procedure is no longer followed, however. (The authors are indebted to Mr.
Toshio Miyatake for the information contained in this paragraph.)
80 KATO, FuH6K6I 91, in 22 Ii6RITSUGAKU ZENSHO (1957).
" See text accompanying notes 17-20 mipra.
' Takezawa v. Morinaga Nyagy6 K.K., unreported case (Okayama Dist. Ct,
No. 161 (wa), 1956); Oyama v. Morinaga Nyfigy6 K.K., unreported case (Okayama
Dist. Ct., No. 531 (wj), (1956).
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because they were not sanguine about their chances of recovery in
view of that decision.
On principle, though, there is a distinction between establishing
negligence in a penal case, where the sanctions are greater and thus
the proof must be heavier, from the circumstances in a civil case, where
only indemnification of loss is sought. One who had been negligent
in such a fashion to be subject to criminal culpability would also be
civilly responsible, but the converse is not necessarily true. In a civil
case, the court could admit a penal conviction as evidence that the
defendant was negligent, but the court could not admit a criminal
acquittal to support a finding of no negligence in a civil case. 3 Thus,
in the milk products case, civil liability to the consumer might have
been found, in spite of a finding of innocence of criminal negligence.
The American lawyer will see many similarities to his own practice.
The differing burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases and the usual
criminal rule in the United States previously mentioned, requiring
excessive negligence or even recklessness, would provide bases for a
distinction similar to that existing in Japan. On the other hand, the
processor of food is now almost universally recognized as being liable
for injuries caused by defects in his products., without regard to care-
lessness vel non and without any necessity of establishing privity.8 4
C. Negligence of Drug Manufacturers
In the one reported Japanese case involving a negligence action
against a drug manufacturer, the plaintiff claimed damages for sus-
taining cataracts as a result of using an eye-lotion. 5 Evidence at the
trial disclosed that the eye-lotion had the properties of a bleach and
that even though used only once the eye-lotion would produce cata-
racts, even if the patient was not allergic. The court concluded that
had the defendant subjected the eye-lotion to additional experiments
prior to marketing, the defendant could have avoided occurrence of the
injury. However, the court took note that available literature con-
tained no description of this type of injury; and, though many persons
used the lotion, very few claimed injury. As a result, the court found
very slight negligence on the defendant's part and awarded the plain-
tiff 50,000 yen (about $140). It is to be observed that had there been
' KAT5, op. cit. supra note 80, at 76.
' See Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without
Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REv. 928 (1957).




more numerous cases of injury, greater negligence might have been
found on the part of the manufacturer, and hence, a larger recovery.
Though this is the only reported case involving products liability of
drug manufacturers in Japan, there are other cases pending:
(1) Parents of children deformed at birth, allegedly due to use of
the drug "Saridomoido" by mothers during pregnancy, have claimed
damages from the drug's manufacturer.86 One of the complaints87
alleges: that the defendant manufacturer inaugurated the sale of its
product with an intensive advertising campaign describing the drug
as "a new nonhabitual sleeping drug" and emphasizing its safety; that
a drug manufacturer owes a duty to determine the virulence, ill-effects,
etc., of a new medicine before marketing it; that by advertising the
drug to be safe for all people, the defendant bears an additional duty to
assure the drug's harmlessness to pregnant women; that the defendant
marketed the drug without assuring itself of its safety; and that in so
doing the defendant was negligent. Plaintiffs are seeking damages of
twenty-four million yen (about $66,667).
(2) The Tokyo District Court recently received a complaint by a
physician against a blood bank.88 The physician had purchased blood
from the defendant and had given a transfusion to a patient. The
patient died as a result of the transfusion, the blood having been con-
taminated with harmful bacteria. Plaintiff was the subject of a widely
publicized investigation by the Tokyo Procurator's Office in relation to
a possible accidental homicide charge. Further, plaintiff was sued by
the patient's family. The result was a demonstrable decrease in the
number of patients at plaintiff's clinic, for which plaintiff is seeking
damages of six million yen (about $16,667).
The American lawyer will sense a certain companionship with his
Japanese counterpart, and will perceive such issues as: (1) Insofar
as the blood transfusion case is concerned, is the physician liable to the
patient's family at all, either on negligence principles (inasmuch as he
probably cannot be expected to apply elaborate tests) or on warranty
(absent a sale)?89 Insofar as strict liability is concened, because of
" In the Kyoto District Court, case No. Wa-1242 (Nakamori v. Dai-Nihon Drug
M g. Co.), 1964; No. Wa-36 (Nishioka et al. v. Dai-Nihon Drug Mfg. Co., 1964) ; and
No. Wa-251 (Tsuboi et. al. v. Dai-Nihon Drug Mfg. Co., Ltd.), 1965. In the Nagoya
District Court, case No. Wa-1152 (Ono v. Dainihon Drug Mfg. Co.), 1963.
s' Case No. Wa-1242, supra note 86.
The Tokyo District Court (23d Division), case No. Wa-5153 (Taku-Kishum
v. Sog5 Blood Bank, Ltd.), 1965.
See Gile v. Kennewick Hosp. Dist., 48 Wn. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
California has a special statute dealing with blood plasma. See 1 FRUMER & FRIED-
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its close connection with warranty, the classification of the relationship
as one of service rather than one of sale probably excludes strict
liability alsoY0 (2) The claim of the physician for economic loss
would, historically at least, be troublesome. The sympathetic appeal
of the claimant who has sustained personal injury seems to have been
a factor in liberalizing the rules governing his recovery. The Restate-
ment's rule, though, is not limited to personal injury. (3) The drug
purveyor or manufacturer will be liable if negligence is established,
but whether strict liability is applicable is an open question. The
Restatement answer is that strict liability does not apply to "unavoid-
ably unsafe products" of which drugs are an illustration. 1
D. Negligence of Suppliers of Products Other Than Food and Drugs
No Japanese decision has been found to impose liability upon the
manufacturer of goods, other than the drug cases already discussed.
In theory, however, the manufacturer can be held responsible for
defects in the design or fabrication of his product. 2
In the United States, there is no dearth of authority concerning the
liability of suppliers of practically any kind of manufactured or pro-
cessed product. Wholesalers and retailers part company with manu-
facturers because the operation of the reasonably prudent man test
produces differing consequences. The manufacturer is not an insurer,
but he will bear the brunt in cases predicated on negligent design or
manufacture.13 A retailer must use reasonable care in handling the
goods, and it would appear that any failure to do so will subject him to
liability and may, at the same time, exculpate the manufacturer. Any
seller, be he manufacturer or not, must make a reasonable inspection of
zmsx, op. cit. supra note 77, § 16.04(3) (b). There may be no test which can be
applied to ascertain the presence of a particular defect. See Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367
(1965).
1 See REsTATE NT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965), which imposes liability on
one who sells, provided he is in the business of selling.
C RFSTATrMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
12 KAT5, op. cit. supra note 80, at 92-93. Kat6, Seirzbutsu sekinin (Products
liability), in 19 NAKAGAWA, CHfiSHAKU xnx6 (Commentary on the Civil Code)
138 (1965).
"'The sine qua non of negligence liability is foreseeability of unreasonable risk
of harm. In Japan, as has been observed, a manufacturer, because of his expertise,
may be held to anticipate more than a layman. This, of course, is true in the United
States, but in addition holdings are extant that the burden on the manufacturer may
involve something more than following the pattern of his competitors. Dean Page
Keeton has written: "Some recent cases make it clear that the manufacturer is not
to be tested as to knowledge on the basis of what manufacturers generally know.
Rather, he must keep reasonably abreast of scientific information and discoveries on
all ingredients or components used in his products." Keeton, Products Liability
-Proof of the Manufacturers Negligence, 49 VA. L. Rsv. 675, 677 (1963).
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his product, but the nature of the product may be such as to preclude
any inspection at all (as in the case of products sold in sealed con-
tainers), or the circumstances may show that the purchaser would not
normally expect an inspection by his immediate seller.9" Both man-
ufacturer and seller owe a duty to warn against any elements of a
product which they know, or ought to know, are dangerous, and which
are not such dangers as to be obvious to any user15
E. Sequence of Cause and Effect
There appears to be no difference between American and Japanese
law on the need for tracing any injury to the product, and any defect
in the product to the defendant. Strict liability under the doctrine of
the Restatement does not obviate this requirement, for the liability is
not absolute. Common sense tells us that the onus of proving that a
defect existed in a product when it left the manufacturer's hands will
vary from one product to another. A bug in a bottle is easier to trace
to the manufacturer or bottler than is a "bug" in a steering mechanism
of a car, particularly a vintage model. In Japan, too, a court ought to
find liability on the manufacturer's part for defects which are unlikely
to occur after the product leaves the manufacturer's hands."
VII. CONTRACT LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER
As previously noted, contractual liability of the manufacturer in
Japanese products liability law is of little practical importance. To
reiterate, it is only in the clearest case that contractual recovery is
even theoretically possible; i.e., that case where the manufacturer has
warranted to the buyer who is personally injured that the goods sold
will be free from defects. In such case the manufacturer would be
liable on the theory of default of obligation under Civil Code article
415. In ordinary business practice such warranties are not made by
Japanese manufacturers directly to Japanese consumers. Even if the
manufacturer's warranty against defects should be judicially implied
under the Latent Defects (kaski tampo) doctrine (Civil Code article
570), it would be the rarest case when the injured party would be in
privity of contract with the manufacturer.
The hurdles thwarting the Japanese products liability plaintiff are
" Cf. Bower v. Corbell, 408 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1965). See 1 HuRsH, Am EmU A LAW
OF PRODUCTS LnmnuTY §§ 2.18, 2.20 (1961).
See 1 HuasH, op. cit. supra note 94, § 2.29.96Kat6, supra note 92, at 135.
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somewhat overcome in the United States by resort to implied war-
ranties and by judicial relaxation of the privity requirement. But
even in the United States, contractual theories of products liability
recovery are not free from difficulties. For example, in the United
States, where the Uniforms Sales Act is in effect, it is at least arguable
that implied warranties of merchantability exist only in transactions
involving unspecified goods and not at all in sales of identified chattels.
The reason is that section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act imposes a
warranty of quality (merchantability) in the following terms: "Where
goods are bought by description from seller who deals in goods of
that description ... there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable quality." The requirement of a sale by description
seems to exclude the purchase and sale of a definite and specific item,
such as the purchase of a can of beans selected by the customer from
a grocery shelf. This requirement was not always adhered to by the
courts, but where it was, the American rule has precluded otherwise
deserving plaintiffs from recovery.
Under the UCC, however, there is no requirement of a sale by
description; thus, there may be warranties in the sale of particular
goods. Specifically, there would be a warranty of merchantability,9 7
but it is not likely that there would be a warranty of fitness for any
particular purpose of the buyer. 8 Both warranties may be found,
though, in sales of unascertained goods.
It is a truism in the United States that warranty liability is not
predicated on negligence. It is rare, by comparison, in Japan that this
is true. Typically, indeed, the supplier's liability is based on negli-
gence. This liability is essentially the same as that of the tort liability
of the supplier, previously discussed, but with one signal difference:
the burden of proving freedom from negligence rests upon the supplier
in a breach of warranty action. In suits based upon tort liability, on
the other hand, it is part of the plaintiff's case to establish that neg-
ligence.
This admixture of negligence and breach of warranty is strange to
one trained in American legal mores, and yet the picture in the United
States is not entirely free of the problem. While the plaintiff in a
warranty suit is not required to show lack of due care in the manu-
facturing or handling process, vestiges of tort theory exist in such
questions as: (1) Does the contributory negligence of the user bar
" UCC § 2-314.
U CC § 2-315.
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recovery for breach of warranty? (2) Which statute of limitations
governs the action-contract or tort? (3) A comparatively recent
debate centers around the relevance of jurisdictional long-arm statutes
(often written in "tort" language) to breach of warranty. 9
VIII. THE FUTURE OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Both in the law of Japan and of the United States, the prognosis is
that increased consumer protection will develop. The next step in
Japan will probably occur in the liability of suppliers of food and will
in all likelihood take the form of strict liability, i.e., liability without
proof of negligence. Just how this will come about is not too certain,
there being three possible developments: (1) a special statute; (2)
recognition that Civil Code article 709 is not without exceptions; or
(3) use of warranty liability.
In the United States, developments will center about the doctrine of
Restatement (Second), Torts section 402A and about the Uniform
Commercial Code. Not all states will accept the full impact of the
former formulation, so it will be some time before a uniform approach
can be found. For those states, such as California and New Jersey,
which find themselves in the forefront of the expansion of consumer
protection, there will be a time for providing some needed details in the
application of the rule. The broad policy seems to have been stated,
however, in terms of greater consumer protection for the days imme-
diately ahead.
'See Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Product Liability Actions, 63 MIcE. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
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